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Abstract
Sometimes it is possible to embed an algebraic trapdoor into a block cipher.
Building on previous research, in this paper we investigate an especially dan-
gerous algebraic structure, which is called a hidden sum and which is related
to some regular subgroups of the affine group. Mixing group theory argu-
ments and cryptographic tools, we pass from characterizing our hidden sums
to designing an efficient algorithm to perform the necessary preprocessing
for the exploitation of the trapdoor.
Keywords: Hidden sums, trapdoor, mixing layer, cryptography, block
ciphers.
1. Introduction
Sometimes it is possible to embed an algebraic trapdoor into a block ci-
pher. Building on previous research, in this paper we investigate an algebraic
structure, which is called a hidden sum and which is related to some regular
subgroups of the affine group. To be more precise, in [1], the authors study
some elementary abelian regular subgroups of the affine general linear group
acting on a space V = (F2)
N , in order to construct a trapdoor for a class of
block ciphers. These subgroups induce alternative operations ◦ on V , such
that (V, ◦) is a vector space over F2. In [1], it is shown that for a class of
these operations, which we will call practical hidden sums, it is possible to
represent the elements with respect to a fixed basis of (V, ◦) in polynomial
time. Moreover, an estimate on the number of these operations is given.
Using this class of hidden sums, the authors provide an attack, which works
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in polynomial time, on ciphers that are vulnerable to this kind of trapdoor.
In this article we continue the analysis started in [1]. In Section 3 we give
a lower bound on the number of practical hidden sums, comparing also this
value with a previous upper bound. From these bounds it is obvious that it
is not feasible to generate all possible practical hidden sums due to the large
number of these even in small dimensions, e.g. for N = 6 we have ∼ 223
practical hidden sums. In Section 4 we study the problem of determining
the possible maps which are linear with respect to a given practical hidden
sums. More precisely, we provide an algorithm that takes as input a given
linear map λ (with respect to the usual XOR on V ) and returns some
operations ◦, which can be defined over V , that are different from the XOR
and for which the map λ is linear, i.e. λ(x ◦ y) = λ(x) ◦ λ(y) for all x, y in
V . Our aim is to individuate a family of hidden sums that can weaken the
components of a given cipher, or to design a cipher containing the trapdoor
based on hidden sums. In the last section we apply the procedure given in
Section 3 to the mixing layer of the cipher PRESENT [2], yelding a set of
hidden sums which linearize this permutation matrix and might in principle
be used to attack the cipher.
2. Preliminaries and motivations
We write Fq to denote the finite field of q elements, where q is a prime
power , and (Fq)
s×t to denote the set of all matrices with entries over Fq with
s rows and t columns. The identity matrix of size s is denoted by Is. We use
ei = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−i
) ∈ (Fq)
N
to denote the unit vector, which has a 1 in the ith position, and zeros else-
where. Letm ≥ 1, the vector (sub)space generated by the vectors v1, . . . ,vm
is denoted by Span{v1, . . . ,vm}.
Let V = (Fq)
N , we denote respectively by Sym(V ), Alt(V ) the symmetric
and the alternating group acting on V . We will denote the translation with
respect to a vector v ∈ V by σv : x 7→ x + v, and T (V,+) will denote the
translations on the vector space (V,+), that is, T (V,+) = {σv | v ∈ V }.
By AGL(V ,+) and GL(V ,+) we denote the affine and linear groups of V .
We write 〈g1, . . . , gm〉 for the group generated by g1, . . . , gm in Sym(V ). The
map 1V will denote the identity map on V .
Let G be a finite group acting on V . We write the action of a permutation
g ∈ G on a vector v ∈ V as vg.
We recall that a permutation group G acts regularly (or is regular) on V if
for any pair x,y ∈ V there exists a unique map g in G such that xg = y.
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Moreover, an elementary abelian group (or elementary abelian p-group) is an
abelian group such that any nontrivial element has order p. In particular, the
group of translations acting on V , T (V,+), is a regular elementary abelian
group.
2.1. Block ciphers and hidden sums
Most modern block ciphers are iterated ciphers, i.e. they are obtained
by the composition of a finite number ℓ of rounds.
Several classes of iterated block ciphers have been proposed, e.g. substi-
tution permutation network [3] and key-alternating block cipher [4]. Here we
present one more recent definition [5] that determines a class large enough to
include some common ciphers (AES [6], SERPENT [7], PRESENT [2]), but
with enough algebraic structure to allow for security proofs, in the contest
of symmetric cryptography. In particular, about properties of the groups
related to the ciphers.
Let V = (F2)
N with N = mb and b ≥ 2. The vector space V is a direct
sum
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vb,
where each Vi has the same dimension m (over F2). For any v ∈ V , we will
write v = v1 ⊕ . . . vb, where vi ∈ Vi.
Any γ ∈ Sym(V ) that acts as vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vbγb, for some γi’s in
Sym(Vi), is a bricklayer transformation (a “parallel map”) and any γi is a
brick. Traditionally, the maps γi’s are called S-boxes and γ a “parallel S-
box”. A linear map λ : V → V is traditionally said to be a “Mixing Layer”
when used in composition with parallel maps. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , b}, with
I 6= ∅, {1, . . . , b}, we say that
⊕
i∈I Vi is a wall.
Definition 2.1. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ,+) is a proper mixing layer if no
wall is invariant under λ.
We can characterize the translation-based class by the following:
Definition 2.2. A block cipher C = {ϕk | k ∈ K} ⊂ Sym(V ), where K is
the set containing all the session keys and ϕk are keyed permutations, over
F2 is called translation based (tb) if:
• it is the composition of a finite number of ℓ rounds, such that any round
ρk,h can be written
1 as γλσk¯, where
- γ is a round-dependent bricklayer transformation (but it does not
depend on k),
- λ is a round-dependent linear map (but it does not depend on k),
(Marco Calderini ), maxsalacodes@gmail.com (Massimiliano Sala)
1we drop the round indices
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- k¯ is in V and depends on both k and the round (k¯ is called a
“round key”),
• for at least one round, which we call proper, we have (at the same
time) that λ is proper and that the map K → V given by k 7→ k¯ is
surjective.
For a tb cipher it is possible to define the following groups. For each
round h
Γh(C) = 〈ρk,h | k ∈ K〉 ⊆ Sym(V ),
and the round function group is given by
Γ∞(C) = 〈Γh(C) | h = 1, . . . , ℓ〉.
An interesting problem is determining the properties of the permuta-
tion group Γ∞(C) = Γ∞ that imply weaknesses of the cipher. A trapdoor
(sometimes called backdoor see [8]) is a hidden structure of the cipher, whose
knowledge allows an attacker to obtain information on the key or to decrypt
certain ciphertexts.
The first paper dealing with properties of Γ∞ was published by Paterson
[9], who showed that if this group is imprimitive, then it is possible to embed
a trapdoor into the cipher. On the other hand, if the group is primitive no
such trapdoor can be inserted. Other works, dealing with security properties
of ciphers related to groups theory, study also whenever the group generated
by the round functions is large [10, 11]. However, as shown in [12], even if
a given set of round functions generates a large permutation group, it might
be possible to approximate these round function by another set of round
functions which generates a small group.
Similarly, the primitivity of Γ∞ does not guarantee the absence of other
types of trapdoors based on the group structure of Γ∞. For example, if
the group is contained in AGL(V ) (which is a primitive group), the encryp-
tion function is affine and once we know the image of a basis of V and the
image of the zero vector, then we are able to reconstruct the matrix and
the translation that compose the map. This motivated the authors of [1]
on studying different abelian operations, which can be individuate on V in
order to embed a trapdoor into a block cipher. The authors in [1] called
these operations hidden sums.
In the remainder of this section, we summarize the theory presented in
[1, Section 2-3-5].
Remark 2.3. If T ⊂ Sym(V ) is an elementary abelian regular group acting
on V , then there exists a vector space structure (V, ◦) such that T is the
related translation group. In fact, since T is regular the elements of the
group can be labelled
T = {τa | a ∈ V },
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where τa is the unique map in T such that 0 7→ a. Then, the sum between
two elements is defined by x ◦a := xτa. Clearly, (V, ◦) is an abelian additive
group and thus a vector space over F2.
Conversely, if (V, ◦) is a vector space over F2, then its translation group,
given by the maps τa : x 7→ x ◦ a, is an elementary abelian group acting
regularly on V .
In the following, with the symbol + we refer to the usual sum over the
vector space V . We denote by T+ = T(V,+), AGL(V,+) and GL(V,+),
respectively, the translation, affine and linear groups w.r.t. +. We use T◦,
AGL(V, ◦) and GL(V, ◦) to denote, respectively, the translation, affine and
linear groups corresponding to a hidden sum ◦. That is, T◦ = {τa | a ∈ V }
where τa : x 7→ x◦a, GL(V, ◦) is the group of the maps λ such that (x◦y)λ =
xλ ◦ yλ for all x,y ∈ V , and any map in AGL(V, ◦) is the composition of a
map λ ∈ GL(V, ◦) and a map τa ∈ T◦.
Since we will focus on a particular class of these operation ◦, we define a
hidden sum any vector space structure (V, ◦), different from the usual (V,+),
such that T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦). While, a practical hidden sum is a hidden sum
such that T◦ is also contained in AGL(V,+).
From [1] we have three interesting problems:
1. Determine the operations ◦ (equivalently the translation groups T◦)
such that T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦).
2. Determine the operations ◦ such that T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) (i.e. those
which are practical hidden sums).
3. Given a parallel S-box γ and a mixing layer λ, determine the operations
◦ such that γ, λ ∈ AGL(V, ◦) or γλ ∈ AGL(V, ◦).
Problem 1 is related to identifying the class of hidden sums that could po-
tentially contain Γ∞(C), of a given cipher C, in the group AGL(V, ◦) since
T+ ⊆ Γ∞(C); or at least to individuating hidden sums for which the XOR
with a round key is affine with respect to the operation ◦.
Operations with the characteristic given in Problem 2 and that of Problem
1 permit to represent an element v in (V, ◦) efficiently, as we will see in Al-
gorithm 2.1.
The last problem permits to understand if a given block cipher could be
modified to introduce the algebraic structure of a hidden sum.
The following vector space plays an important role for studying these
problems. Let T be any subgroup of the affine group, we can define the
vector space
U(T ) = {v ∈ V | σv ∈ T}.
In [1] the authors proved
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Proposition 2.4 (Proposition 3.6 [1]). Let V = (F2)
N , dim(V ) = N . Let
T ⊆ AGL(V,+) be an elementary abelian regular subgroup. If T 6= T+, then
1 ≤ dim(U(T )) ≤ N − 2.
A characterization is given in [1] for the maps that generate a translation
group T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) such that T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦). We recall that for
every a, τa ∈ T◦ ⊂ AGL(V,+) can be written as κaσa for a linear map
κa ∈ GL(V,+). We will denote by Ω(T◦) = {κa | a ∈ V } ⊂ GL(V,+).
Moreover κa = 1V if and only if a ∈ U(T◦).
We recall the following definition.
Definition 2.5. An element r of a ring R is called nilpotent if rm = 0 for
some m ≥ 1 and it is called unipotent if r− 1 is nilpotent, i.e. (r− 1)m = 0
for some m ≥ 1.
Let G ⊆ GL(V,+) be a subgroup consisting of unipotent permutations,
then G is called unipotent.
Lemma 2.6 (Lemma 3.11 [1]). Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+). We have that Ω(T◦)
is unipotent. Moreover, for all y ∈ V κ2
y
= 1V .
Theorem 2.7 (Theorem 3.17 [1]). Let N = n+d and V = (F2)
N , with n ≥ 2
and d ≥ 1. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) be such that U(T◦) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d}.
Then, T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦) if and only if for all κy ∈ Ω(T◦) there exists a matrix
By ∈ (F2)
n×d such that
κy =
[
In By
0 Id
]
.
Note that we can always suppose that U(T◦) is generated by the last
vectors of the canonical basis, as any group T◦ is conjugated to a group T◦′
such that U(T◦′) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d} (see [1, Theorem 3.14]).
Indeed, let T◦ be a translation group of a practical hidden sum, with U(T◦) =
Span{v1, . . . ,vd}. We have that v1, . . . ,vd are linear independent with
respect to the sum +, which implies that there exists a linear map g ∈
GL(V,+) such that vig = en+i for i = 1, . . . , d. Thus, the conjugated group
T◦′ = gT◦g
−1 is such that U(T◦′) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d} and ◦
′ is again a
practical hidden sum.
Practical hidden sums with U(T◦) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d} are easier to
study thanks to the particular structure reported in Theorem 2.7.
Remark 2.8. When U(T◦) is generated by the last vectors of the canonical
basis, then the maps τei generate T◦, i.e. the canonical vectors form a basis
also for the vector space (V, ◦). Indeed, thanks to the form of the maps
κei given in Theorem 2.7, it is possible to verify that combining the maps
τei’s we are able to obtain all the 2
N different maps contained in T◦ (see [1,
Lemma 3.7 and Corollary 3.8] for further details).
6
In [1] it turns out that for any practical hidden sum T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+),
any given vector v can be represented in (V, ◦), with respect to the canonical
vectors, in polynomial time (O(N3)). Let T◦ be a practical hidden sum with
U(T◦) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d} (dim(V ) = N = n+ d), then the algorithm
for determining the representation of a given vector v is the following
Algorithm 2.1.
Input: vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ V
Output: coefficients α1, . . . , αN such that α1e1 ◦ ... ◦ αNeN = v.
[i] αi ← vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
[ii] v′ ← vτα1
e1
· · · ταn
en
;
[iii] αi ← v
′
i for n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ d;
return α1, . . . , αN .
Correctness of Algorithm 2.1:
To find the coefficients α1, . . . , αN is equivalent to individuating the maps τei
which generate the map τv. So, we need to understand which maps (among
the τei) are needed to send 0 in v, or equivalently v in 0 (since T◦ is an
elementary regular subgroups, τv is the unique map such that 0τv = v and
vτv = 0).
Note that thanks to the form of the maps κei given in Theorem 2.7,
whenever we apply a map κei to a vector x, the first n entries of x are left
unchanged. So, if the entry vi is equal to 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to delete it we
need to apply τei . This explains step [ii].
Now, v′ = vτα1
e1
· · · ταn
en
is such that the first n entries are all zero. So,
we need to delete the entry v′j for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ N , whenever v
′
j = 1. Since
τej = σej for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ N , we apply τej if v
′
j = 1.
So, we have obtained a map τ ∈ T◦ such that vτ = 0, and since this is
unique we have τ = τv.
Note that if U(T◦) is not generated by the last vectors of the canonical
basis, then we can consider the conjugated group T◦′ = gT◦g
−1, with g as
above, and we need to apply Algorithm 2.1 to vg, obtaining its representation
in (V, ◦′). This leads us to obtain the representation of v in (V, ◦) with
respect to the basis {e1g
−1, ..., eN g
−1} of (V, ◦). In particular, the map g is
an isomorphism of vector space between (V, ◦) and (V, ◦′).
From this, the authors proved that a hidden sum trapdoor is practical,
whenever Γ∞ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦) and T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+).
A class of these practical hidden sums is used in [13] to weaken the non-
linearity of some APN S-boxes. In addition, in [13] a differential attack with
respect to hidden sums is presented.
An upper bound on the number of some hidden sums is given in [1] and
reported below.
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Let n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1. According to Theorem 2.7, denote the matrix κei by
κei =


b
(i)
1,1 . . . b
(i)
1,d
In
...
...
b
(i)
n,1 . . . b
(i)
n,d
0 Id

 , (1)
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 2.9 (Theorem 5.5 [1]). Let N = n + d and V = (F2)
N , with
n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1. The number of elementary abelian regular subgroups
T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) such that dim(U(T◦)) = d and T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦) is[
N
d
]
2
· |V(In,d)| (2)
where V(In,d) is the variety of the ideal In,d ⊂ F2
[
b
(s)
i,j | 1 ≤ i, s ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d
]
generated by
S0 ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3
with
S0 =
{(
b
(s)
i,j
)2
− b
(s)
i,j | 1 ≤ i, s ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d
}
S1 =


n∏
i=1
d∏
j=1
(
1 +
∑
s∈S
b
(s)
i,j
)
| S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, S 6= ∅

 ,
S2 =
{
b
(s)
i,j − b
(i)
s,j | 1 ≤ i, s ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d
}
,
S3 =
{
b
(i)
i,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d
}
,
and
[
N
d
]
q
=
∏d−1
i=0
qN−i−1
qd−i−1
is the Gaussian Binomial.
Proposition 2.10 (Proposition 5.6 [1]). Let In,d defined as in Theorem 2.9,
then
|V(In,d)| ≤ 2
d
n(n−1)
2 − 1−
n−2∑
r=1
(
n
r
) (n−r2 )∏
1
(
2d − 1
)
= µ(n, d).
3. New lower bounds and asymptotic estimates
In this section we will provide a lower bound on the cardinality of the
variety V(In,d). Moreover we will show that the ratio between the upper
bound and lower bound is less than e
2d+1
2d(2d−1) .
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From Theorem 2.7 and from Remark 2.8, we have that a group T◦ with
U(T◦) = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d} is determined by the maps κei ’s, and in
particular by Be1 , . . . , Ben (Bei = 0 for n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ d). Thus, we need
to construct the matrices Be1 , . . . , Ben so that:
i) dim(U(T◦)) = d. Then for any v ∈ Span{e1, . . . , en}, Bv 6= 0. In-
deed, v ∈ U(T◦) if and only if Bv = 0. Moreover, for any v =
(v1, . . . , vn+d) ∈ V we have
κv =
[
In
∑n
i=1 viBei
0 Id
]
and so we get that Bv =
∑n
i=1 viBei (see Lemma 5.4 in [1]).
This implies that every non-null linear combination of Be1 , . . . , Ben is
non-zero. Note that, in Theorem 2.9, this condition is given by S1.
ii) T◦ is abelian. This happens if and only if the ith row of Bej is equal
to the jth row of Bei , obtaining the set S2.
iii) T◦ is elementary, that is, τ
2
v
= 1V for all v. Then κv fixes v and, in
particular, κei fixes ei. This is equivalent to having the ith row of Bei
equals to 0, which is expressed by S3.
Consider now any matrix Bei . Its size is n×d, thus any row of Bei can be
written as an element of F2d . Let us define the matrix B◦ = [Be1 . . . Ben ] ∈
(F2d)
n×n. From Condition i), ii) and iii), above, we have the following prop-
erties for B◦:
(I) B◦ is full rank over F2, when seen as an element of (F2)
n×nd. This
guarantees that dim(U(T◦)) = d.
(II) B◦ is symmetric. Since the ith row of Bej is equal to the jth row of
Bei we have that the entry (i, j) of B◦ is equal to the entry (j, i).
(III) B◦ is zero-diagonal, as the ith row of Bei is zero for all i.
Example 3.1. Let N = 5 and d = 2 and consider the operation ◦ defined
by the following Bei ’s:
Be1 =

0 01 1
1 1

 , Be2 =

1 10 0
0 1

Be3 =

1 10 1
0 0

 , Be4 =

0 00 0
0 0

 , Be5 =

0 00 0
0 0


Since we have n = N − d = 3, we just need to focus on Be1 , Be2 and Be3 .
Representing the rows of the matrices as elements of F22 = {0, 1, α, α + 1},
where α2 = α+ 1, we can rewrite the matrices as
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Be1 =

 0α+ 1
α+ 1

 , Be2 =

α+ 10
α

 , Be3 =

α+ 1α
0


and so we can rewrite B◦ as
B◦ =
[
Be1 Be2 Be3
]
=

 0 α+ 1 α+ 1α+ 1 0 α
α+ 1 α 0


In Theorem 2.9 we have a one-to-one correspondence between the matri-
ces Bei ’s and the points of V(In,d). Thanks to the B◦ construction, we have
a one-to-one correspondence between the matrices B◦ ∈ (F2d)
n×n having the
above characteristics (I), (II), (III) and the groups T◦ with U(T◦) generated
by en+1, . . . , en+d. That is, defining
Mn,d = {B◦ ∈ (F2d)
n×n | B◦ satisfies conditions (I), (II), and (III)}
we have |Mn,d| = |V(In,d)|. Thus, we aim to estimate |Mn,d|.
We recall the following result given in [15].
Proposition 3.2. Let q be a power of 2. The number of n × n symmetric
invertible matrices over Fq with zero diagonal is{
q(
n
2)
∏⌈n−1
2
⌉
j=1
(
1− q1−2j
)
if n is even
0 if n is odd
.
Proposition 3.3. Let N = n + d and V = (F2)
N , with n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1.
Let q = 2d. Then we can define a lower bound ν(n, d) ≤ |Mn,d| by
ν(n, d) =

q
(n2)
∏⌈n−1
2
⌉
j=1
(
1− q1−2j
)
if n is even
(qn−1 − 2n−1)q(
n−1
2 )
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1
(
1− q1−2j
)
if n is odd
Proof. We require that B◦ is full rank over F2, thus if it is invertible this
condition is satisfied. Then the value given in Proposition 3.2 is a lower
bound on the number of all acceptable matrices B◦. However, if n is odd
from Proposition 3.2 we would have only 0 as lower bound.
To tackle the n-odd case, we want to reduce it to the n-even case. We
show how it is possible to construct a matrix B◦ for fixed values n and d
starting from a given B′◦ defined for values n
′ = n− 1, where n− 1 is even,
and d′ = d. Indeed, let B′◦ ∈ (F2d)
n−1×n−1 be such that it is full rank over
F2, symmetric and zero-diagonal. We need to construct the first row (the
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first column is the transpose of this) of B◦, setting all the others equal to
the rows of B′◦. That is,
B◦ =
[
0 b
b⊺ B′◦
]
.
Then, we need to verify how many possible B◦ we can construct starting
from B′◦, or equivalently how many vectors b ∈ (F2d)
n−1 we can use, in
order to enforce B◦ ∈ Mn,d.
As B′◦ is full rank over F2, summing the rows of this matrix we can
create 2n−1 − 1 non-zero vectors. Thus, we can choose 2d(n−1) − 2n−1 dif-
ferent vectors b of (F2d)
n−1 to construct B◦. Hence, for any n we have
(2d(n−1) − 2n−1)|Mn−1,d| ≤ |Mn,d| and, in particular, for n odd we have at
least (2d(n−1) − 2n−1)ν(n− 1, d) possible matrices B◦.
Proposition 3.4. Let N = n+ d and V = (F2)
N . Then
|Mn,d| =


2d − 1 if n = 2
(2d + 3)(2d − 1)(2d − 2) if n = 3
2(
n
2)
∏⌈n−1
2
⌉
j=1
(
1− 21−2j
)
if d = 1 and n is even
0 if d = 1 and n is odd
Proof. The cases n = 2 and n = 3 were already proved in [1]. We restate
here the proof using symmetric matrices, obtaining a shorter and clearer
proof.
If n = 2 then
B◦ =
[
0 x
x 0
]
with x ∈ F2d . Of course the only vector that we have to avoid is the zero
vector. Thus we can use 2d − 1 vectors x to construct B◦.
If n = 3 then
B◦ =

0 y zy 0 x
z x 0


with x,y, z ∈ F2d such that B◦ ∈ Mn,d.
We need to find all the triples (x,y, z) such that the matrix B◦ is full
rank over F2, that is, summing any rows of it we do not obtain the zero
vector. Let us consider the different cases:
• x 6= 0 : 2d − 1 possible values for x,
– y = 0 : so z /∈ {0,x} and so we get 2d − 2 possible values
– y = x : so z /∈ {0,x} and so we get 2d − 2 possible values
– y 6= x : so z can be any element, y /∈ {0,x}. So 2d(2d − 2)
possible pairs (y, z).
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• x = 0 : we have y 6= 0 and z /∈ {0, y} and so we get (2d − 1)(2d − 2)
possible pairs (y, z).
Summing all the possible triple (x,y, z), we get
(2d−1)(2d−2+2d−2+2d(2d−2))+(2d−1)(2d−2) = (2d−1)(2d−2)(2d+3)
Now, let n ≥ 2 and fix d = 1. As we consider F2d = F2, we have that
Mn,d is the set of symmetric matrices having all zeros on the diagonal and
invertible. From Proposition 3.2 we have our claim.
Let us compare the upper bound and the lower bound on the cardinality
of Mn,d. We recall a theorem on the infinite product convergence criteria,
corollary of the monotone convergence theorem (more details can be found
in [16]).
Lemma 3.5.
Let {aj}j∈N ⊆ R+. Then
∞∏
j=1
aj converges if and only if
∞∑
j=1
ln(aj) converges.
Moreover, assume aj ≥ 1, and denote aj = 1 + pj. Then
1 +
∞∑
j=1
pj ≤
∞∏
j=1
(1 + pj) ≤ e
∑
∞
j=1 pj ,
that is, the infinite product converges if and only if the infinite sum of the pj
converges.
Proposition 3.6. Let µ(n, d) be the bound given in Proposition 2.10 and let
ν(n, d) be the bound given in Proposition 3.3. Let q = 2d and d ≥ 2. If n is
even, then
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ e
q+1
q(q−1)
if n is odd, then
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤ 2
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ 2e
q+1
q(q−1) .
Proof. We have
µ(n, d) =q(
n
2) − 1−
n−2∑
r=1
(
n
r
)
(q − 1)(
n−r
2 )
≤q(
n
2).
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Consider the case n even
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤
q(
n
2)
q(
n
2)
∏⌈n−1
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
=
⌈n−1
2
⌉∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
,
since we can write
1
1− q1−2j
=
q2j−1
q2j−1 − 1
= 1 +
q
q2j − q
.
Defining
pj :=
q
q2j − q
we trivially have that pn ≥ 0 and
1 +
∞∑
j=1
pj ≤
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ e
∑
∞
j=1 pj .
We have for any j ≥ 2
pj ≤
1
qj
.
From this, we get
∞∑
i=1
pj ≤ p1 +
∞∑
i=2
1
qj
=
2
q − 1
−
1
q
=
q + 1
q(q − 1)
and so
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ e
q+1
q(q−1) .
Now let n be odd,
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤
q(
n
2)
(qn−1 − 2n−1) · q(
n−1
2 )
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
.
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Since
(
j
i
)
=
(
j−1
i−1
)
+
(
j−1
i
)
, n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2 we have
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤
qn−1
(qn−1 − 2n−1) ·
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
=
1(
1− 2
n−1
qn−1
)
·
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
≤
1(
1− 2
n−1
qn−1
) ∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ 2
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
≤ 2e
q+1
q(q−1) .
Note that in Proposition 3.6, the comparison for the case d = 1 is avoided
as the lower bound is the exact value of |Mn,d|.
Corollary 3.7. For all possible values of n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2 we have
lim
n→∞
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
=
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
and
lim
d→∞
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
= 1.
Proof. Consider the case n odd, then
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
=
q(
n
2)
(
1− 1
q(
n
2)
−
∑n−2
r=1 (
n
r)
∏(n−r2 )
i=1 (q−1)
q(
n
2)
)
(qn−1 − 2n−1) · q(
n−1
2 )
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
=
(
1− 1
q(
n
2)
−
∑n−2
r=1 (
n
r)
∏(n−r2 )
i=1 (q−1)
q(
n
2)
)
(
1− 2
n−1
qn−1
)
·
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
=
(
1− 1
q(
n
2)
−
∑n−2
r=1 (
n
r)
∏(n−r2 )
i=1 (q−1)
q(
n
2)
)
(
1− 2
n−1
qn−1
) ⌈
n−2
2
⌉∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
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Consider
∑n−2
r=1
(
n
r
)∏(n−r2 )
i=1 (q − 1)
q(
n
2)
=
∑n−2
r=1
(
n
r
)
(q − 1)(
n−r
2 )
q(
n
2)
≤
n−2∑
r=1
(
n
r
)
q(
n−1
2 )−(
n
2)
≤
2n−2
qn−1
.
(3)
This implies that the limit of (3), as n approaches infinity, is 0 and then the
limit
lim
n→∞
q(
n
2)
(
1− 1
q(
n
2)
−
∑n−2
r=1 (
n
r)
∏(n−r2 )
i=1 (q−1)
q(
n
2)
)
(qn−1 − 2n−1) · q(
n−1
2 )
∏⌈n−2
2
⌉
j=1 (1− q
1−2j)
=
∞∏
j=1
1
(1− q1−2j)
.
The case n even is similar.
Moreover, from the proof of Proposition 3.6 we have
1 ≤
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
≤


e
q+1
q(q−1) if n is even
1(
1− 2
n−1
qn−1
)e
q+1
q(q−1) if n is odd
and immediately we have that
lim
d→∞
µ(n, d)
ν(n, d)
= 1.
Remark 3.8. From the results obtained in this section we can see that if we
would tackle Problem 3. given in Section 2, then it is not possible to search
among all the possible practical hidden sums of a given space V . Indeed, it
will be computationally hard, given the huge amount of these operations, also
in small dimensions.
4. On hidden sums for linear maps
In this section we investigate Problem 3 given in Section 2 page 5. In
particular we want to see if, for a given λ ∈ GL(V,+), it is possible to
individuate an alternative sum ◦ such that λ ∈ GL(V, ◦).
Proposition 4.1. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) and λ ∈ GL(V,+) ∩ GL(V, ◦) then
U(T◦) is invariant under the action of λ, i.e. U(T◦)λ = U(T◦).
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Proof. Recall that λ is linear with respect to both + and ◦. Let y ∈ U(T◦),
and so x ◦ y = x+ y for any x. Thus, for all x we have
x ◦ yλ = xλ−1λ ◦ yλ = (xλ−1 ◦ y)λ = (xλ−1 + y)λ = x+ yλ.
That implies yλ ∈ U(T◦), and so U(T◦)λ ⊆ U(T◦).
Proposition 4.2. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) and λ ∈ GL(V,+). Then λ is in
GL(V,+) ∩GL(V, ◦) if and only if for all x ∈ V we have
κxλ = λκxλ, (4)
where τx = κxσx.
Proof. Let y be fixed. Then for all x we have
(x ◦ y)λ = xλ ◦ yλ
where
(x ◦ y)λ = (xκy + y)λ
= xκyλ+ yλ
and
xλ ◦ yλ = xλκyλ + yλ.
Imposing the equality we get
x(κyλ) = xλκyλ.
Vice versa let x,y ∈ V
(x ◦ y)λ = xκyλ+ yλ
= xλκyλ + yλ
= xλ ◦ yλ.
Now we will characterize the linear maps which are also linear for an op-
eration ◦, such that U(T◦) is generated by the last elements of the canonical
basis.
Proposition 4.3. Let V = (F2)
N , with N = n + d, n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1. Let
T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) with U(T◦) = Span{en+1, ..., en+d}. Let λ ∈ GL(V,+).
Then λ ∈ GL(V,+) ∩GL(V, ◦) if and only if
λ =
[
Λ1 Λ2
0 Λ3
]
,
with Λ1 ∈ GL((F2)
n), Λ3 ∈ GL((F2)
d), Λ2 any matrix in (F2)
n×d and for
all x ∈ V BxΛ3 = Λ1Bxλ (see Theorem 2.7 for the notation of Bx).
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Proof. Let
λ =
[
Λ1 Λ2
Λ4 Λ3
]
,
Λ1 ∈ (F2)
n×n, Λ3 ∈ (F2)
d×d, Λ2 ∈ (F2)
n×d and Λ4 ∈ (F2)
d×n
From Proposition 4.1 we have that Λ4 = 0 as U(T◦) is λ-invariant. Thus,
as λ is invertible Λ1 ∈ GL((F2)
n) and Λ3 ∈ GL((F2)
d).
By standard matrix multiplication it can be verified that (4) and BxΛ3 =
Λ1Bxλ are equivalent. Then, we need to show that this condition does not
depend on the matrix Λ2. Indeed, let x = (x1, ..., xn, xn+1, ..., xn+d) ∈ V ,
and define x¯ = (x1, ..., xn) and x
′ = (xn+1, ..., xn+d), i.e. x = (x¯,x
′). As
reported in Section 3 page 9, we have κx = κ(x¯,0), which implies Bx = B(x¯,0),
for all x ∈ V . Then, BxΛ3 = Λ1Bxλ for all x ∈ V if and only if B(x¯,0)Λ3 =
Λ1B(x¯Λ1,0) for all x¯ = (x1, ..., xn). So we have[
Λ1 Λ2
0 Λ3
]
∈ GL(V, ◦),
for any Λ2.
In the following, as Λ2 in Proposition 4.3 could be any matrix, we will
consider linear maps of type[
Λ1 ∗
0 Λ3
]
∈ GL(V, ◦),
with Λ1 ∈ GL((F2)
n), Λ3 ∈ GL((F2)
d) and ∗ denotes for any matrix of size
n× d.
Remark 4.4. From the propositions above, if we want to find an operation
◦ that linearizes a linear map λ ∈ GL(V,+), i.e. we want to enforce[
Λ1 ∗
0 Λ3
]
∈ GL(V, ◦),
then we have to construct some matrices Bx’s such that BxΛ3 = Λ1Bxλ for
all x. Moreover, as the standard vectors ei’s form a basis for the operation ◦,
then we need to individuate only the matrices Bei , so that BeiΛ3 = Λ1Beiλ,
and in particular that
BeiΛ3 = Λ1Beiλ = Λ1
(
n∑
i=1
ciBei
)
,
where c1, . . . , cn are the first components of the vector eiλ.
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Algorithm 4.1.
INPUT:
λ =
[
Λ1 ∗
0 Λ3
]
,
with Λ1 ∈ GL((F2)
n), Λ3 ∈ GL((F2)
d)
OUTPUT: all practical hidden sums (with κei as in (1)) such that:
• T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+), T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦),
• U(T◦) contains en+1, ..., en+d,
• λ ∈ GL(V, ◦).
ALGORITHM STEPS:
I) Consider the canonical basis e1, ..., en+d and compute e1λ, ..., enλ
II) Solve the linear system given by the equations:
1. for all i = 1, ..., n
BeiΛ3 = Λ1Beiλ = Λ1
(
n∑
i=1
ciBei
)
,
(where c1, ..., cn are the first components of the vector eiλ).
2. for all i = n+ 1, ..., n + d
Bei = 0,
3. for all i = 1, ..., n
e¯iBei = 0,
(here e¯i is the truncation of ei with respect to the first n coordi-
nates)
4. for all i, j = 1, ..., n
e¯iBej = e¯jBei ,
III) return the solutions {Bei}i=1,...,n+d.
Correctness of Algorithm 4.1:
Note that thanks to the form of the maps κei given in Theorem 2.7, we always
have κ2
ei
= 1V , whatever the matrix Bei is. This property, with condition 3
in the algorithm, implies τ2
ei
= 1V , so T◦ = 〈τe1 , ..., τen+d〉 is elementary.
Condition 4 guarantees that T◦ is abelian. Then, T◦ is also regular (see
Corollary 3.8 in [1] for more details). This implies that T◦ = 〈τe1 , ..., τen+d〉
is a practical hidden sum.
The first condition, as seen in Proposition 4.3, is equivalent to having κeiλ =
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λκeiλ for all ei, and for Remark 4.4, we have also κxλ = λκxλ for any x.
Then, from Proposition 4.2 we have λ ∈ GL(V, ◦). To conclude, condition 2
implies that U(T◦) contains en+1, ..., en+d.
Viceversa, consider T◦ a practical hidden sums (with κei as in (1)) such
that:
• T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+), T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦),
• U(T◦) contains en+1, ..., en+d,
• λ ∈ GL(V, ◦).
We need to check that T◦ is an output of the algorithm. Equivalently, we
need to check that the matrices Bei associated to this group satisfies the
condition of the system in Algorithm 4.1.
Since T◦ is elementary and abelian, conditions 3 and 4 are satisfied. Also,
condition 2 holds because U(T◦) contains en+1, ..., en+d. For the first condi-
tion, since λ ∈ GL(V, ◦) we have κxλ = λκxλ for any x, which is equivalent
to BxΛ3 = Λ1Bxλ for all x, and in particular for all ei.
Note that, from Algorithm 4.1 we obtain operations ◦ such that
{en+1, . . . en+d} ⊆ U(T◦). Indeed, we required that for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n + d,
Bei = 0, but we did not require that the combinations of Be1 , ..., Ben are
non-zero. So, if we want to construct hidden sums with dim(U(T◦)) = d, we
just process the solution of Algorithm 4.1 and discharge the B◦’s such that
rankF2(B◦) < n.
4.1. Complexity of our search algorithm
To solve the linear system in our algorithm, we represent the matrices as
vectors:


b1,1 · · · b1,d
...
. . .
...
bn,1 · · · bn,d

←→ [
1-st row︷ ︸︸ ︷
b1,1, ..., b1,d,
2-nd row︷ ︸︸ ︷
b2,1, ..., b2,d, ... ,
n-th row︷ ︸︸ ︷
bn,1, ..., bn,d
]
• From i = 1, ..., n,
∑
j cjΛ1Bej = BeiΛ3 we have n
2d linear equation in
n2d variables.
• From e¯iBei = 0 and e¯iBej = e¯jBei we obtain
(
n+1
2
)
d linear equations,
in the same variables.
So, we only need to find a solution of a binary linear system of size(
n2d+
(
n+ 1
2
)
d
)
· n2d.
Therefore, we have immediately the following result
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Proposition 4.5. The time complexity of Algorithm 4.1 is O
(
n6d3
)
and the
space complexity is O
(
l · 2d−1n2
)
where l is the dimension of the solution
subspace.
In Table 1 we report some timings for different dimensions of the message
space V , fixing the value of d equal to 2.
Dimension of V n, d Timing in second
64 62, 2 32.620 seconds
80 78, 2 84.380 seconds
96 94, 2 188.200 seconds
112 110, 2 338.590 seconds
128 126, 2 616.670 seconds
Table 1: Computation timing for a Mac Book Pro 15” early 2011, 4 GB Ram, Intel i7
2.00 Ghz.
5. Hidden sums for PRESENT’s mixing layer
Here we report our results on the search for a hidden sum suitable for
the mixing layer of PRESENT, λP , which is defined by the permutation
reported in Table 2.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
iλP 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51 4 20 36 52
i 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
iλP 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55 8 24 40 56
i 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
iλP 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59 12 28 44 60
i 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
iλp 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63 16 32 48 64
Table 2: PRESENT mixing layer
Algorithm 4.1 requires in input a linear function in the block form:
λ′ =
(
Λ1 ∗
0 Λ3
)
(5)
with Λ1 ∈ GL((F2)
n) and Λ3 ∈ GL((F2)
d) for some integers n and d.
Note that a matrix as in (5) is such that the space U ′ = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d}
is λ′-invariant. So, in order to transform a mixing layer λ into one as in (5),
it is necessary to individuate a subspace U such that Uλ = U . Then, by
conjugating λ by a linear map π such that Uπ = Span{en+1, . . . , en+d}, we
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will have πλπ−1 as in (5). From a group T◦ obtained from Algorithm 4.1 for
the map πλπ−1 we will obtain a hidden sum for λ, that is, π−1T◦π.
For this reason we consider the matrix given by the permutation
πP = (1, 61)(22, 62)(43, 63) ∈ Sym({i | i = 1, ..., 64})
so that
πPλPπ
−1
P =
(
Λ1 0
0 I4
)
= λˆP
We can now apply Algorithm 4.1 and obtain all the possible operations that
linearize λˆP . The operation space will be denoted by O.
The time required to compute the operation space O is ∼ 10.420 seconds
and it is generated by 2360 60-tuples of 60 × 4 matrices. So the number
of operations that linearize λˆP , in the form described in Theorem 2.7, is
|O| = 22360.
We take a random operation ◦ (Table 3) obtained by our algorithm.
The operation has rankF2(B◦) = 60 = n and so the operation is such that
dim(U(T◦)) = 4 = d. To compress the table, we represent every row of
Bei as a number in {0, ..., (2
4 − 1)}, and, as we did in Remark 4.1, row i
represents the matrix Bei .
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Be1 0 8 0 10 8 9 7 3 0 9 4 15 1 15 7 15 8 14 7 0 4 5 9 0 15 1 10 10 2 15 6 7 0 5 7 5 10 8 6 6 10 4 8 7 1 2 8 0 11 14 9 11 14 7 13 1 5 3 8 0
Be2 8 0 7 10 14 7 13 6 7 8 3 12 15 13 11 6 14 15 9 11 14 15 12 6 9 6 0 3 14 8 15 6 10 0 10 4 11 8 3 9 9 0 8 6 7 2 2 8 8 5 14 2 1 6 0 9 12 11 12 8
Be3 0 7 0 2 10 4 14 5 15 8 12 15 0 15 15 15 7 7 6 7 3 1 12 6 8 15 12 15 9 11 3 14 15 4 2 9 0 7 6 6 15 2 0 9 14 13 8 0 12 7 6 11 5 9 12 13 15 10 1 0
Be4 10 10 2 0 8 8 2 15 12 15 12 5 7 3 12 12 15 12 8 8 3 14 15 14 14 8 11 9 7 4 10 6 0 6 5 0 9 10 0 1 1 2 12 0 8 3 13 1 7 8 6 8 8 8 4 8 0 2 2 11
Be5 8 14 10 8 0 15 0 5 7 9 10 14 10 11 4 2 14 14 11 1 7 6 8 6 13 12 3 0 6 6 9 9 7 9 9 12 8 6 0 11 3 0 6 12 12 3 6 8 15 14 7 8 13 8 2 15 11 15 2 8
Be6 9 7 4 8 15 0 12 15 7 10 10 6 12 0 0 12 14 0 8 8 0 5 13 9 11 7 5 0 12 14 11 5 3 2 15 1 7 4 10 5 7 11 12 11 9 8 2 4 3 0 0 12 15 1 1 4 11 12 7 14
Be7 7 13 14 2 0 12 0 4 4 7 13 6 6 5 10 10 9 11 4 13 2 3 8 0 11 7 2 6 10 14 10 10 8 11 11 9 2 12 11 13 13 8 11 1 8 10 7 15 14 11 11 13 14 6 9 2 13 1 13 5
Be8 3 6 5 15 5 15 4 0 7 1 11 3 8 7 6 0 14 12 10 5 0 0 14 6 11 9 14 2 6 0 14 5 9 10 11 0 9 10 14 7 8 8 13 8 6 6 9 2 7 6 15 14 5 11 4 15 4 4 5 14
Be9 0 7 15 12 7 7 4 7 0 6 2 6 2 7 9 11 10 3 0 5 4 14 7 9 14 12 6 12 5 6 6 13 15 8 15 15 8 15 2 10 12 12 15 1 15 15 9 0 0 9 14 0 15 11 13 1 15 3 8 0
Be10 9 8 8 15 9 10 7 1 6 0 6 3 8 7 9 13 11 7 6 8 8 6 12 7 4 9 1 12 10 2 8 1 0 2 11 1 6 4 0 8 5 15 12 2 5 0 12 10 9 9 4 2 15 8 5 5 10 12 6 7
Be11 4 3 12 12 10 10 13 11 2 6 0 12 5 2 12 7 9 7 5 0 15 11 5 10 11 9 14 3 11 12 10 3 15 13 12 13 11 2 11 1 12 13 10 13 3 7 8 10 1 8 5 0 13 9 3 9 9 14 0 7
Be12 15 12 15 5 14 6 6 3 6 3 12 0 6 10 15 0 7 9 5 13 0 11 9 15 11 7 8 3 15 0 3 9 14 8 3 12 4 6 7 1 5 0 9 9 7 5 0 1 8 6 7 13 13 1 12 12 1 6 11 9
Be13 1 15 0 7 10 12 6 8 2 8 5 6 0 8 0 8 8 3 9 8 8 6 10 8 2 15 0 4 15 14 1 8 12 14 1 0 15 8 2 2 12 11 12 2 5 9 0 11 7 7 8 12 3 4 3 14 12 10 13 10
Be14 15 13 15 3 11 0 5 7 7 7 2 10 8 0 2 4 1 15 15 4 8 14 10 3 13 4 0 0 5 5 11 0 5 14 13 11 8 12 11 13 0 8 0 0 13 5 14 14 8 5 13 3 4 1 8 5 5 6 13 0
Be15 7 11 15 12 4 0 10 6 9 9 12 15 0 2 0 3 12 11 10 5 1 3 3 14 9 0 6 10 0 15 1 0 15 13 9 9 1 12 14 2 13 0 5 4 12 0 1 5 0 4 1 3 11 2 8 8 9 10 4 5
Be16 15 6 15 12 2 12 10 0 11 13 7 0 8 4 3 0 8 12 12 0 12 4 4 4 13 4 13 0 14 5 11 11 0 11 10 5 2 0 5 10 0 2 1 4 13 8 8 8 12 13 9 1 3 8 15 6 3 7 12 11
Be17 8 14 7 15 14 14 9 14 10 11 9 7 8 1 12 8 0 7 8 13 15 9 6 8 0 8 0 2 5 6 11 15 7 13 3 11 9 12 0 15 10 3 2 2 14 0 12 8 10 6 12 6 11 6 3 6 4 9 6 8
Be18 14 15 7 12 14 0 11 12 3 7 7 9 3 15 11 12 7 0 10 0 0 4 7 14 2 4 11 8 0 1 12 5 4 12 10 0 8 13 5 11 15 10 12 2 0 1 7 9 8 15 6 12 8 9 0 5 1 5 11 4
Be19 7 9 6 8 11 8 4 10 0 6 5 5 9 15 10 12 8 10 0 7 7 5 9 2 2 4 15 0 9 8 12 6 8 7 6 9 6 12 1 8 11 0 2 12 4 5 6 9 15 1 3 13 8 7 12 1 1 8 2 10
Be20 0 11 7 8 1 8 13 5 5 8 0 13 8 4 5 0 13 0 7 0 15 5 4 5 14 12 8 5 5 1 6 14 15 5 2 2 15 10 0 11 13 11 3 14 13 8 13 15 3 7 10 4 4 3 0 0 11 13 0 14
Be21 4 14 3 3 7 0 2 0 4 8 15 0 8 8 1 12 15 0 7 15 0 5 4 1 12 13 10 1 15 9 5 4 7 11 7 11 10 7 11 12 10 5 12 7 6 0 11 14 12 12 9 12 0 14 8 5 0 11 2 9
Be22 5 15 1 14 6 5 3 0 14 6 11 11 6 14 3 4 9 4 5 5 5 0 10 9 10 13 3 10 5 8 2 1 13 2 9 8 1 1 1 1 3 12 11 7 9 8 11 1 8 15 12 6 0 0 13 1 0 0 0 7
Be23 9 12 12 15 8 13 8 14 7 12 5 9 10 10 3 4 6 7 9 4 4 10 0 4 12 12 1 9 10 11 1 13 15 7 9 0 4 12 6 1 2 4 0 2 6 9 7 1 8 9 7 4 12 13 12 1 12 15 0 8
Be24 0 6 6 14 6 9 0 6 9 7 10 15 8 3 14 4 8 14 2 5 1 9 4 0 6 13 3 13 11 12 9 8 11 14 12 15 8 11 9 12 9 4 8 1 1 9 9 15 4 0 0 5 1 12 9 0 2 7 2 7
Be25 15 9 8 14 13 11 11 11 14 4 11 11 2 13 9 13 0 2 2 14 12 10 12 6 0 8 11 9 4 0 13 2 4 11 13 13 7 7 8 1 13 2 10 13 6 6 1 5 6 10 8 11 5 14 10 3 10 10 7 7
Be26 1 6 15 8 12 7 7 9 12 9 9 7 15 4 0 4 8 4 4 12 13 13 12 13 8 0 6 12 14 4 1 1 7 12 2 12 12 12 4 15 5 1 4 0 9 9 2 8 10 10 6 0 10 11 9 10 3 1 7 9
Be27 10 0 12 11 3 5 2 14 6 1 14 8 0 0 6 13 0 11 15 8 10 3 1 3 11 6 0 5 14 9 4 12 2 8 13 0 0 4 9 7 11 9 5 0 7 13 13 4 2 8 0 2 11 4 10 1 14 2 5 6
Be28 10 3 15 9 0 0 6 2 12 12 3 3 4 0 10 0 2 8 0 5 1 10 9 13 9 12 5 0 4 9 1 8 13 10 7 0 5 9 13 5 3 10 15 4 12 5 3 2 3 6 5 8 8 9 5 13 8 7 8 13
Be29 2 14 9 7 6 12 10 6 5 10 11 15 15 5 0 14 5 0 9 5 15 5 10 11 4 14 14 4 0 6 7 15 7 11 8 4 1 9 8 4 11 14 0 5 3 2 8 14 8 6 6 13 7 0 6 0 6 14 9 3
Be30 15 8 11 4 6 14 14 0 6 2 12 0 14 5 15 5 6 1 8 1 9 8 11 12 0 4 9 9 6 0 12 0 9 6 9 2 7 13 4 7 10 3 4 2 15 13 1 7 8 11 1 8 3 12 9 9 14 9 9 0
Be31 6 15 3 10 9 11 10 14 6 8 10 3 1 11 1 11 11 12 12 6 5 2 1 9 13 1 4 1 7 12 0 0 10 1 14 10 8 15 2 4 1 7 10 4 1 5 4 3 2 4 6 7 13 7 7 1 2 4 0 6
Be32 7 6 14 6 9 5 10 5 13 1 3 9 8 0 0 11 15 5 6 14 4 1 13 8 2 1 12 8 15 0 0 0 1 3 11 3 5 10 3 2 9 1 6 11 12 13 0 5 14 0 11 4 5 9 10 1 8 1 7 1
Be33 0 10 15 0 7 3 8 9 15 0 15 14 12 5 15 0 7 4 8 15 7 13 15 11 4 7 2 13 7 9 10 1 0 14 12 15 6 12 12 3 2 6 11 8 6 12 1 0 2 5 15 15 7 6 15 14 9 6 9 0
Be34 5 0 4 6 9 2 11 10 8 2 13 8 14 14 13 11 13 12 7 5 11 2 7 14 11 12 8 10 11 6 1 3 14 0 13 10 4 8 2 10 11 11 13 7 11 9 13 7 2 4 6 10 13 0 6 10 9 13 1 15
Be35 7 10 2 5 9 15 11 11 15 11 12 3 1 13 9 10 3 10 6 2 7 9 9 12 13 2 13 7 8 9 14 11 12 13 0 12 5 5 14 10 12 11 0 8 5 3 0 4 12 11 12 7 0 10 3 3 13 1 13 10
Be36 5 4 9 0 12 1 9 0 15 1 13 12 0 11 9 5 11 0 9 2 11 8 0 15 13 12 0 0 4 2 10 3 15 10 12 0 10 3 6 1 9 14 3 1 1 8 4 7 12 6 15 3 5 14 10 0 9 2 4 5
Be37 10 11 0 9 8 7 2 9 8 6 11 4 15 8 1 2 9 8 6 15 10 1 4 8 7 12 0 5 1 7 8 5 6 4 5 10 0 9 15 12 6 1 13 6 3 12 2 7 8 10 5 12 7 2 0 6 9 8 12 9
Be38 8 8 7 10 6 4 12 10 15 4 2 6 8 12 12 0 12 13 12 10 7 1 12 11 7 12 4 9 9 13 15 10 12 8 5 3 9 0 1 1 9 6 4 7 7 12 0 9 15 14 9 4 4 4 9 13 0 1 2 1
Be39 6 3 6 0 0 10 11 14 2 0 11 7 2 11 14 5 0 5 1 0 11 1 6 9 8 4 9 13 8 4 2 3 12 2 14 6 15 1 0 4 13 9 2 13 0 10 5 10 11 14 8 13 8 3 5 12 0 7 0 4
Be40 6 9 6 1 11 5 13 7 10 8 1 1 2 13 2 10 15 11 8 11 12 1 1 12 1 15 7 5 4 7 4 2 3 10 10 1 12 1 4 0 14 2 7 4 6 7 0 6 10 14 3 11 6 9 1 0 10 4 4 3
Be41 10 9 15 1 3 7 13 8 12 5 12 5 12 0 13 0 10 15 11 13 10 3 2 9 13 5 11 3 11 10 1 9 2 11 12 9 6 9 13 14 0 14 7 0 12 3 13 7 5 11 3 10 2 12 7 11 12 10 8 4
Be42 4 0 2 2 0 11 8 8 12 15 13 0 11 8 0 2 3 10 0 11 5 12 4 4 2 1 9 10 14 3 7 1 6 11 11 14 1 6 9 2 14 0 13 5 8 5 0 6 0 14 7 5 0 9 13 3 6 4 13 10
Be43 8 8 0 12 6 12 11 13 15 12 10 9 12 0 5 1 2 12 2 3 12 11 0 8 10 4 5 15 0 4 10 6 11 13 0 3 13 4 2 7 7 13 0 12 0 0 4 11 8 14 13 1 4 5 8 4 3 11 8 15
Be44 7 6 9 0 12 11 1 8 1 2 13 9 2 0 4 4 2 2 12 14 7 7 2 1 13 0 0 4 5 2 4 11 8 7 8 1 6 7 13 4 0 5 12 0 11 8 8 8 13 9 0 8 13 9 3 0 4 0 8 8
Be45 1 7 14 8 12 9 8 6 15 5 3 7 5 13 12 13 14 0 4 13 6 9 6 1 6 9 7 12 3 15 1 12 6 11 5 1 3 7 0 6 12 8 0 11 0 3 9 9 6 15 7 9 10 0 5 11 15 3 0 15
Be46 2 2 13 3 3 8 10 6 15 0 7 5 9 5 0 8 0 1 5 8 0 8 9 9 6 9 13 5 2 13 5 13 12 9 3 8 12 12 10 7 3 5 0 8 3 0 4 13 4 4 12 15 0 9 5 10 10 1 3 10
Be47 8 2 8 13 6 2 7 9 9 12 8 0 0 14 1 8 12 7 6 13 11 11 7 9 1 2 13 3 8 1 4 0 1 13 0 4 2 0 5 0 13 0 4 8 9 4 0 8 2 5 11 12 0 2 8 7 4 4 8 7
Be48 0 8 0 1 8 4 15 2 0 10 10 1 11 14 5 8 8 9 9 15 14 1 1 15 5 8 4 2 14 7 3 5 0 7 4 7 7 9 10 6 7 6 11 8 9 13 8 0 10 3 15 15 0 0 10 7 5 6 7 0
Be49 11 8 12 7 15 3 14 7 0 9 1 8 7 8 0 12 10 8 15 3 12 8 8 4 6 10 2 3 8 8 2 14 2 2 12 12 8 15 11 10 5 0 8 13 6 4 2 10 0 15 5 12 8 14 9 6 0 1 0 1
Be50 14 5 7 8 14 0 11 6 9 9 8 6 7 5 4 13 6 15 1 7 12 15 9 0 10 10 8 6 6 11 4 0 5 4 11 6 10 14 14 14 11 14 14 9 15 4 5 3 15 0 3 0 5 6 2 5 0 7 8 2
Be51 9 14 6 6 7 0 11 15 14 4 5 7 8 13 1 9 12 6 3 10 9 12 7 0 8 6 0 5 6 1 6 11 15 6 12 15 5 9 8 3 3 7 13 0 7 12 11 15 5 3 0 0 13 15 3 9 12 1 9 1
Be52 11 2 11 8 8 12 13 14 0 2 0 13 12 3 3 1 6 12 13 4 12 6 4 5 11 0 2 8 13 8 7 4 15 10 7 3 12 4 13 11 10 5 1 8 9 15 12 15 12 0 0 0 0 4 0 11 5 10 4 8
Be53 14 1 5 8 13 15 14 5 15 15 13 13 3 4 11 3 11 8 8 4 0 0 12 1 5 10 11 8 7 3 13 5 7 13 0 5 7 4 8 6 2 0 4 13 10 0 0 0 8 5 13 0 0 5 5 14 2 11 14 15
Be54 7 6 9 8 8 1 6 11 11 8 9 1 4 1 2 8 6 9 7 3 14 0 13 12 14 11 4 9 0 12 7 9 6 0 10 14 2 4 3 9 12 9 5 9 0 9 2 0 14 6 15 4 5 0 13 8 15 12 1 15
Be55 13 0 12 4 2 1 9 4 13 5 3 12 3 8 8 15 3 0 12 0 8 13 12 9 10 9 10 5 6 9 7 10 15 6 3 10 0 9 5 1 7 13 8 3 5 5 8 10 9 2 3 0 5 13 0 8 0 5 4 2
Be56 1 9 13 8 15 4 2 15 1 5 9 12 14 5 8 6 6 5 1 0 5 1 1 0 3 10 1 13 0 9 1 1 14 10 3 0 6 13 12 0 11 3 4 0 11 10 7 7 6 5 9 11 14 8 8 0 3 2 11 5
Be57 5 12 15 0 11 11 13 4 15 10 9 1 12 5 9 3 4 1 1 11 0 0 12 2 10 3 14 8 6 14 2 8 9 9 13 9 9 0 0 10 12 6 3 4 15 10 4 5 0 0 12 5 2 15 0 3 0 1 1 7
Be58 3 11 10 2 15 12 1 4 3 12 14 6 10 6 10 7 9 5 8 13 11 0 15 7 10 1 2 7 14 9 4 1 6 13 1 2 8 1 7 4 10 4 11 0 3 1 4 6 1 7 1 10 11 12 5 2 1 0 4 6
Be59 8 12 1 2 2 7 13 5 8 6 0 11 13 13 4 12 6 11 2 0 2 0 0 2 7 7 5 8 9 9 0 7 9 1 13 4 12 2 0 4 8 13 8 8 0 3 8 7 0 8 9 4 14 1 4 11 1 4 0 8
Be60 0 8 0 11 8 14 5 14 0 7 7 9 10 0 5 11 8 4 10 14 9 7 8 7 7 9 6 13 3 0 6 1 0 15 10 5 9 1 4 3 4 10 15 8 15 10 7 0 1 2 1 8 15 15 2 5 7 6 8 0
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6. Conclusions
Continuing the study of [1], here we focused on the class of hidden sums
such that T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) and T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦), which we called practical
hidden sums, as these could be used to exploit new attacks on block ciphers.
We gave a lower bound on the number of the practical hidden sums.
Then we compared this lower bound with the upper bound given in [1].
In the second part, we dealt with the problem of individuating possible
practical hidden sums for a given linear map, providing Algorithm 4.1 and
showing an example on the case of the PRESENT’s mixing layer.
A dual approach is under investigation in [14] (some of the results are
reported in [13]), where the author takes into consideration some S-boxes,
which would be strong according to classical cryptanalysis, and identify some
practical hidden sums that weaken significantly the non-linearity properties
of the S-Boxes. Once the candidate hidden sums have been found, some
(linear) mixing layers are constructed such that they are linear with respect
to a hidden sum and the resulting cipher turns out to be attackable by the
clever attacker.
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